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;: FULL REPORT OF RESEARCH ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS: 
‘THEROLE OF ‘EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL' PARTIES IN THE 
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY. 
DR. J. MCAULEY & DR. J. TONGE 
JANUARY 2001 
Background 
The project examined the extent to which loyalists and republicans are prepared to co-operate 
within the Northern Ireland Assembly, by analysing the relationship between the Progressive 
Unionist Party (PUP) and Sinn F&n within the devolved institutions. Of the 108 members of the 
legislative Assembly (MLAs), elected in May 1998, Sinn F&n have 18 representatives and the 
PUP have two. Sinn F&n’s Assembly representation was sufficient for the party to be awarded 
two ministries (Education, and Health, Social Services and Public Safety) under the D’Hondt 
mechanism of ensuring cross-community representation on the Executive. 
Two Sinn F&n MLAs sit on each of the ten departmental committees, except Regional 
Development, on which there is only one Sinn FCin MLA. Sinn F&n members chair the Finance 
and Enterprise committees. The PUP is represented on two departmental committees (Regional 
Development and Social Development). Sinn F&n is also represented within each of the six 
standing committees of the Assembly; they are joined by the PUP on the ‘Committee of the Centre’ 
and the ‘Audit Committee’. 
Objectives 
The overarching aim of the research project was to examine the extent of co-operation between 
loyalists and republicans, as represented by the PUP and Sinn F&n, within the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. The project aimed to discover what factors enhanced or inhibited such co-operation and 
whether the Assembly acted as an institutional facilitator, or barrier, to such a far-reaching 
development. Within this broad aim, the project had the following specific objectives: 
(1) To explore the extent to which the PUP and Sinn FCin offer a common 
political agenda; 
(2) To examine which aspects of the Northern Ireland Assembly (e.g. 
departmental committees; the civic forum; informal MLA alliances; attendant cross- 
border bodies) offer the greatest prospects for co-operation; 
(3) To analyse how both parties envisage the future development of Northern 
Ireland’s devolved institutions; 
(4) To assess the extent to which both MIAs from either use models of 
institutional co-operation to promote replication among supporters from republican 
and loyalist cornrnunities (the ‘spillover’ effect). Alternatively, is such co-operation 
prompted from below by a ‘grassroots’ thawing of relations between the two 
communities? 
Each objective was fulfilled in that the project yielded information on each aspect of the role 
of extra constitutional parties within the Assembly. This information is analysed in the results 
section below. The embryonic and fragile basis of the Assembly means that further charting of 
republican-loyalist co-operation is required. 
Methods 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted during summer 2000 with 16 PUP members, including 
both MIAs and 14 party executive members and/or councillors. Further interviews were held with 
22 Sinn F&n members (10 MIAs). The interviews covered a core fifteen questions relating to 
perceptions of the Assembly; the role of departmental committees and discussions of relations with 
the PUP/Sinn F&n, compared to other parties. It was felt that qualitative data was a much more 
useful and thorough means of information gathering than quantitative techniques in respect of 
MLAs. There were several reasons for this: the imbalance in representation between the two 
parties; the ability to gain much more information through long interviews (average one hour) and; 
the ease with which the project could be extended by deploying qualitative data gathering methods 
to tiers ‘below’ the Assembly, notably councillors and officers from both parties. 
Thus several Sinn F&n councillors were interviewed, to examine their views on how 
republican-loyalist co-operation on local councils might best be transferred to the Assembly. A 
wider questionnaire survey of MLAs across all parties may have some value in examining their 
views for the likelihood of republican-loyalist, or unionist-nationalist, co-operation. Quantitative 
data gathering was used via a questionnaire survey of PUP members (n. b. an ongoing survey of 
Sinn F&n members was commenced under the co-applicant’s ESRC ‘New Nationalism in 
Northern Ireland’ project R000222668, with questions on attitudes to devolved institutions and 
cross party co-operation to be incorporated). 
The questionnaire survey of PUP members involved a pilot of 100 questionnaires, 
distributed to a random sample of one-sixth of the party’s membership. 56 replies were received. A 
further 250 questionnaires were then issued, with replies to be collected unopened at PUP. HQ, 
182 Shankill Road, Belfast, with an approximately similar response rate recorded. During the 
loyalist feud, however, the HQ was attacked and gutted by the UFF, and the questionnaires 
destroyed. Following the recently agreed loyalist paramilitary ‘truce’, it is hoped to restart the 
questionnaires during the next month. 
Results 
There was wide agreement hat the establishment of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland 
through a new Assembly rests at the convergence of the differing dynamics represented in the Irish 
peace process. This was instituted as part of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ (GFA), under which 
the Assembly has fuil iegisiative and executive authority in respect of those matters previously 
within the remit of 6 Northern Ireland government departments. (These being the Department of 
Agriculture; Department of Economic Development; Department of Education; Department of the 
Environment; Department of Finance and Personnel; Department of Health and Social Services). 
On 25th June 1998, members were elected to the Assembly by proportional representation 
(Single Transferable Vote) from the existing 18 Westminster constituencies. Under the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, the Assembly was given power to make acts within its legislative competence 
and operates, where appropriate, on a cross-community basis. It is headed by a First Minister, a 
Deputy First Minister and up to 10 ministers with departmental responsibility. The Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, however, remains responsible for Northern Ireland Office matters not 
devolved to the Assembly, including policing, security policy, prisons and criminal justice. 
Results at this stage concerning the workings within the Assembly are necessarily 
preliminary. The Assembly was suspended by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 1 I* 
February to 29* May 2000, due to the lack of progress on arms decommissioning. When, 
following negotiations, the suspension was lifted and the Assembly began work again on 5th June 
2000, it immediately found itself embroiled in such divisive issues as the future of policing and the 
flags issue. Further, the Assembly so far, has passed only one substantive piece of legislation. 
Accordingly, the researchers were obliged to slightly broaden the scope of the project, also 
analysing the views of Sinn F&n and PUP members outside the Assembly of their expectations of 
co-operation between republicans and loyalists. This additional research was conducted through 
semi-structured interviews and a pilot survey of PUP members. 
Such additional research was adversely affected by the loyalist feud between the UVF/PUP 
and UDA/UFF/UDP in the late summer and autumn of 2000. During this time, seven people were 
killed, including members of the party we were surveying, and around 650 families were forcibly 
re-housed (see also ‘Methods’ section, for impact upon our quantitative data collection). 
Tentatively, the research project refutes the idea that the consociational form of political 
agreement forged in Northern Ireland necessarily leads to a freezing of ethnic bloc rivalries.. The 
research also questions the validity of the model that assumes that intra ethnic rivalries will lead to a 
hardening of unionist-nationalist contests due to the electoral imperative Bf parties being seen to -1 
‘defend’ their bloc. The research instead argues that there is some scopi for ‘rainbow coalitions’ 
within the Assembly. Given this background, we would make the following observations 
regarding the four main objectives of the project: 
Objective 1: To explore the extent to which the PUP and Sinn FCin offer a 
common political agenda. 
The return of devolved government to Norttem Ireland 4 , as enjoyed ,much p~puku- support, but ‘he 
new political institutions remain brittle. Northern Ireland’s politic remains dominated by the search 
for a stable political settlement and a working inclusive set of political arrangements. 
Recent dramatic political changes have been reflected in the fragmentation of Unionism. 
Central to the PUP’s development are the reconstruction of relationships, not only with other 
Unionists, but also with the ‘traditional enemy’, Sinn F&n. This is particularly important in terms 
of the possible development of a ‘new politics’ in Northern Ireland (see below). 
Under the influence of its current leadership, the PUP has grown from a single branch of 
around thirty members located in Belfast, to structured party with a claimed membership of around 
600, organised across eleven branches. One of those interviewed, now a leading party member and 
elected representative, explains the party’s development as follows: 
(T)he PUP originated out of a necessity, because particularly in the working class 
communities, loyalist viewpoints weren’t being represented, particularly on social 
issues. There was a wide gap between what we would see as a middle class 
unionist party and one side and a fanatical fundamentalist DUP on the other side. 
What we needed was a party with new ideas. (PUP Interview 03). 
Indeed, the interviews revealed a consistency in the belief that Unionist politicians had 
largely absolved themselves of many social and economic responsibilities, by giving primacy to the 
constitutional issues. This was reflected in several interviews that articulated a growing sense of 
awareness that the ‘Stormont system’ had failed. This has led, not just to a reassessment of the 
Unionist leadership, but for some, to a complete reassessment of what loyalism means. Further, 
PUP many activists argued that the intransigence of sections of political Unionism, (particularly the 
Democratic Unionist Party), throughout the peace process, has been detrimental to the loyalist 
community. A large majority (87.5) of the PUP membership surveyed voted ‘yes’ in the May 1998 
referendum. 
Hence, the PUP came to the Assembly supporting the idea of ‘shared responsibility’ 
between the ‘two traditions’ as the basis for a solution. Several of those interviewed spoke of the 
possibility of a ‘politics of realignment’ between the Protestant working class and the Catholic 
/ 
working class. .a .- 
In the past, many in the &otestant working class have steadfastly refused to believe that it 
was possible to seek any political accommodation with Nationalists. Further, any left of centre 
articulation of social and economic issues was often seen as a direct challenge to Unionist control 
of the Northern Irish State itself. For the leadership of the PUP an important stated goal remains, 
an injection of working class politics to get people to rally around social and economic issues. As 
one MLA expressed it: 
‘The only vehicie which will I think destroy the budding cultivated fiower of 
sectarianism is class politics and we’ve got to replace that sectarianism (and) at 
some future date actually create real alignment in politics on economic and social 
issues, as opposed to the divisive religious and constitutional. (PUP interview 16). 
One of the most important aspects of the PUP activists interviewed was an almost uniform 
justification of the willingness to enter into debate with the traditional ‘enemies of Ulster’. Indeed, 
of those surveyed, almost three quarters of PUP members (74.1%) believed that Sinn FCin should 
be allowed to participate in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
This willingness to engage political opposition, even with those constructed as traditional 
enemies, (and in some cases literally so), directly marks out the PUP and its supporters from other 
strands within Unionism. Until extremely recently the open expression of such a political stance 
would have been untenable from a representative of working class loyalism. 
In this sense the PUP has provided focal points for increasingly coherent social, economic 
and political challenges within unionism. From within the PUP interviews, for example, there ate 
claims for the need for direct state intervention in key areas of the economy and a clear emphasis on 
the need for strong state support for the health and social security services. This particularly 
apparent in higher education, where several interviewees echoed the party line in advocating a full 
return to state subsidised funding to the equivalent levels of 1979. 
PUP members also expressed distinct views on other social issues. Unlike most ethnic bloc 
parties in Northern Ireland, many interviewed expressed a desire to promote women’s issues. 
Indeed, almost half of the PUP executive committee is made up of women. The PUP is also one of 
the few political organisations, certainly amongst Unionism, which has been supportive of Gay 
and Lesbian rights and which is candidly ‘pro-choice’ on the abortion issue. Most of those 
interviewed were sympathetic to such causes. Such views are far from primary to traditional 
expressions of Unionist ideology. 
As several of those interviewed noted there are widespread feelings from within the 
Protestant working class that they are in political decline and psychological retreat. Hence, the PUP 
has been relatively successful in drawing support especially from that section of the community 
normally disengaged with politics. Well over eighty per cent (88.7) of PUP members have never 
previously been a member of any political party in Northern Ireland. Several interviewees 
recognised this social base, as for example, in the following: 
It’s predominantly working class people who votes for the PUP, but then again 
. . .you just can’t say that it’s all loyalist working class or it’s all, because it’s not. 
We’re attracting academics .. . all sorts of people because they got us as a new party 
saying new things, so that’s what we’re gearing for, we don’t want to be known as 
just a working ciass party or just a loyalist party. (PUP Interview 03). 
These shifting contours of unionist identity are extremely important for the possible future 
direction of politics. The traditional construction of a ‘British’ identity by Ulster loyalism, has not 
only included, but also absorbed a multitude of other key identities, such as gender, geographical 
location, sexual preference, class identity, and so on. These have been organised into a collective 
political discourse. The PUP may provide the dynamic to begin to separate these key identities, and 
to reformulate its central components. This may form the basis for the creation of alternative 
formulation of a new politics. 
There are, however, still obvious limits to this. One area that PUP members do not exhibit 
change is in their primary sense of national identity. The majority (62.5) still identified themselves 
as ‘British’. While others have adopted such hybrid labels as ‘British-Irish’ (23.2) and ‘Northern 
Irish’ (10.7%), there is little evidence of movement in this core self-identifier. 
Likewise, Sinn F&n MIAs conceded no ground on questions of national identity. They 
accused the PUP of being confused on what constituted their Britishness. The Unionist promotion 
of Ulster-Scats, within the Culture Arts and Leisure Committee and more widely within the 
Assembly, was seen as evidence of such insecurities. Sinn F&in MLAs were divided on whether 
there were any positive aspects of Orange culture. 
Sinn F&n MLAs remain sceptical of the overall rationale of the leftist agenda of the PUP. 
Nonetheless, Sinn F&n MLAs believed that common agendas could be forged on specific items. 
One such area was education. Sinn F&n MLAs were hostile to the 1 l+ examination and university 
tuition fees. Such views were also reflected in the PUP’s membership. Understandably, Sinn 
F&n’s control of the education ministry and presence on the HE committee led to a belief that the 
party would shape the educational agenda. The PUP is unrepresented on either committee. 
Sinn F&n has attempted to restate its left of centre credentials during the past 18 months, 
notably with the emphasis upon a republican labour agenda at its 2000 ard fheis. Whilst still 
incoherent as to whether genuinely redistributive policies and equality are attainable within the state 
of Northern Ireland, Sinn F&n’s priorities of expansionist housing programmes; the removal of 
educational selection and the establishment of a strategic framework for the expansion of public 
services are items in accord with the PUP’s agenda. 
Clearly, Sinn F&n and the PUP offer political agendas which, whilst diametrically .opposed 
in constitutional terms and in assertions of national identity, have much in common in respect of 
socio-economic agendas. The possible abolition of the 1 l+ examination also reveals considerable 
intra party division. With Sinn F&n’s control of the education ministry, the PUP’s support for 
abolition offers the possibility of a cross community, class based alliance with republicans. 
Certainly in interviews there were no strong objections expressed by the PUP leadership to co- 
operation at this level 
Objective 2: To examine which aspects of the Northern Ireland Assembly offer the 
greatest prospects for co-operation. 
Most committee work has been concerned with statutory rules. Relations between Sinn F&n and 
the PUP are generally recognised as cordial, notwithstanding historical aspects, such as sectarian 
killings, which gave Sinn F&n members ‘major reservations’ about dealing with the PUP at the 
outset. 
Within departmental committees, there is an anxiety to achieve consensus, fostered by the 
committee clerk, and the option to formally record dissent has been avoided. Zero-sum game 
loyalist-republican sectarian politics have been rare, although there have been tensions on the 
Social Development Committee. Here, Sinn F&n argue that the PUP (represented by Billy 
Hutchinson) has concerned itself with ‘maintaining territory’ for its supporters in respect of 
regeneration projects in north Belfast (interview, Michelle Gildernew, SF MLA, Fermanagh and 
South Tyrone, ‘28 June 2000). 
Within the Assembly itself, all of Sinn F&n’s MLAs declared themselves closer to the PUP 
than their fellow nationalists within the SDLP. Most attribute this to the similarities in class 
background between themselves and PUP MLAs. Each MLA conceded, however, that there were 
important political variations within the SDLP, with Mitchel McLaughlin, in particular, stressing 
the importance of not treating parties as a ‘monolith’ (interview 28 June 2000). 
Likewise the PUP leadership expressed a willingness to form co-operation and some sense 
of common agenda arising from a similarity of class background. One leading member put this 
forcibly when he was asked to identify possible areas of similarity with Sinn F&in in the Assembly: 
Well, where I suppose we might agree with them (Sinn F&n) is that we are 
absolutely opposed to the eleven plus and that the process of selection is something 
that needs serious thinking about. We’re the only unionist party by the way who 
oppose the eleven plus. We’re the only unionist party who actively promote gay 
and lesbian rights. We’re the only unionist party who, in fact, we may well be the 
only party, who confirmed our commitment to pro choice in the abortion debate. 
So therefore it isn’t simply just this Prod thing for us, it is not that. It’s about, if 
this is a chance to build the parameters of a sensible modem wholesome society 
then f**** sake let’s do all of it. (PUP interview 16). 
Futher, within the Assembly, Sinn F&n MLAs were hostile to the idea of electoral pacts 
with the SDLP. The concept of pan nationalism was decisively rejected. This view was held 
because of Sinn F&n perceptions of SDLP disinterest in the equality agenda and the view that the 
SDLP has ‘bottled’ negotiations on Strand 2 of the Agreement, diminishing its ah-Jreiand 
dimension (interview with Pat Doherty, MLA, 27 June 2000). 
Other Sinn F&n MLAs argued that the SDLP was weakest on the equality agenda 
(interviews with Alex Maskey, SF MLA, West Belfast, 20 May 2000; Mary Nelis, SF MLA, 
Foyle, 28 June 2000). The failure of the SDLP to support Sinn F&n’s proposals for a Women’s 
Department or the establishment of a Minister for Children came in for particular criticism. 
Objective 3: To analyse how both parties envisage the future development of 
Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions. 
Both parties saw the civic forum as the aspect of the new institutions most likely to foster the 
development of cross-community consensus. Equally, both parties have been disappointed with its 
construction, arguing that it will become a middle-class talking shop. The GFA says little about the 
construction of the forum, declaring merely that it will be consultative. The Agreement allows the 
First and Deputy First Minister to establish guidelines for the selection of civic forum members. 
In common with the PUP, Sinn F&n believed that representatives from the ‘voluntary 
sector’ would include cross community former prisoners groups into the forum and create greater 
consensus. The party is critical of the extent of business representation within the forum (interview 
with Mary Nelis, SF MLA, 28 June 2000). Sinn F&n argue for a devolved model for the civic 
forum, with a such forums based in each constituency. This decentralised model has attracted some 
sympathy from the PUP. 
Despite the barriers, Mary Nelis and other MLAs insisted that ‘cross party class alliances 
would form’. These alliances would cover a wide range of issues including gender. Nelis asserted 
that she could ‘do business’ more easily with Billy Hutchinson (PUP) on gender issues than with 
the ‘middle class professionals of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition’. 
The issue of abortion divides Sinn F&n (unlike the PUP, which is clearly ‘pro-choice’). 
Two MLAs described their own party’s position as ‘ambiguous’. Sinn Fein MLAs preferred a 
non-literal reading of the GFA in terms of its future development. The party’s MLAs offered a 
model of future cross-border co-operation based upon economic logic, which would override the 
formal requirements for Assembly approval for further expansion of the all-Ireland dimension 
within the GFA. 
/ *’ ;’ 
For Sinn F&n’s MLAs the question of permanent commitment to the Assembly, and co- 
operation with loyalists was ranged against the promotion of participation to the party base as a 
tactic designed to achieve transition to unity. The Party Chair, Mitchel McLaughlin, emphasised the 
tactical flexibility of the party in arguing that even abstentionism from Westminster was a ‘tactic not 
a principle for republicans’ declaring that abstention reflected merely the fact that there was ‘no 
value in participation at Westminster’. 
Whiie there is also commitment to the Assembly by the PUP, there is concern regarding the 
wider political agenda. Hence, several interviees refered to Sinn F&in’s perceived tactic to ‘narrow 
the ground of unionism by the use of the in your face street politics’, while David Ervine has 
spoken of being ‘sucked out of the process by Sinn F&n’s actions’ (NI Assembly Official Report 
[Hansard], Monday 24 January 2000). This dovetails directly with some of the issues below. 
Objective 4: To assess the extent to which both MLAs from either use models of 
institutional co-operation to promote replication among supporters from 
republican and loyalist communities. 
Public co-operation with republicans remains difficult for the PUP, which is sensitive to criticisms 
concerning developing closer relationships with Sinn F&n. In particular, it is vulnerable its local 
rivals the Ulster Democratic Party and the Democratic Unionist Party. The broad politics of internal 
unionist criticism of the PUP can be set out as follows. The PUP has bought into the current 
political settlement which is merely part of a broader strategy to persuade Unionists to accept the 
greening of their cultural and political identity that will ultimately render a transfer of sovereignty 
inevitable, through a concealed process of unification. 
This is countered directly by the views from PUP supporters. Indeed, almost two-thirds of 
PUP members agreed that the Union between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland is ‘as 
strong as ever’. Over 80% of PUP members, however, also rejected the idea that the peace process 
has moved Northern Ireland into greater Union within the United Kingdom, although given the 
devolution of powers and legitimation of the pursuit of Irish unity by nationalists, this is 
unsurprising. Most PUP members appear to believe that the GFA is sufficient to maintain the 
Union, upholding the consent principle and therefore the Union, rather than significantly altering 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. 
Many PUP members, however, refute the ‘equality agenda’ as projected by Sinn F&n and 
the notion of discrimination against Catholics. PUP members divided almost equally on whether 
Catholics and Protestants were treated equally today. Almost half believed that employers were 
more likely to give jobs to Catholics in contemporary Northern Ireland. The attitude towards the 
notion that Catholics remain ‘second class citizens’ can be clearly seen in the following from PUP 
executive memb*& 
I think that the second class citizenry that Sinn F&n would argue about is that of 
attitude, because the structures in society are definitively not sectarian . . . the issue 
of equality I don’t think is anywhere near as high or should be anywhere near as 
high on Sinn F&n’s agenda. (PUP interview 16). 
PUP members remains hostility to Sinn F&n’s wider political agenda. No PUP members 
iisted Sinn Fein among their leading seven vote transfer preferences. These tensions became 
particularly manifest when the PUP perceived that Sinn F&n were acting out of narrow interests. 
An example, was found amid the row that developed after ministers McGuinness and de Bruin 
ordered their civil servants not to fly the flag as part of the Coronation Day celebrations. This was 
seen by the PUP as yet another case of Sinn F&n’s ‘in your face politics’ and a lack of sincerity 
about brining about conflict resolution. As one PUP executive member put it: 
Most people could live with Sinn F&n Assembly members as Assembly members 
representing their constituency, but when they took executive positions, they 
represented everyone. So, whenever they went into a position in the executive and 
did what they did about the flags and then were prepared to sit on committees with 
RUC members . . . Well it was clear they won’t represent unionist, so therefore they 
won’t perform their executive role. (PUP Interview 09). 
For Sinn F&n, there is little or no electoral damage from association with loyalists, proving 
such links do not diminish the party’s ‘green’ credentials in terms of intra ethnic bloc rivalry with 
the SDLP. 
In terms of stabilising Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions, the areas of commonality 
between Sinn F&n and the PUP are apparent, although, as reserved items, there is little scope for 
meaningful co-operation. Both parties continued to regard the issue of decommissioning as an 
artificial barrier to political progress. Both parties accept the need for reform of the RUC, although 
there are significant divisions among the PUP membership. Nor are the parties hugely divided over 
the third contentious area of Orange parades, although, again, PUP members are divided over 
compromise on this issue. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the following conclusions can (tentatively) be drawn: 
l There is genuine scope for cross-community informal co-operation between Sinn 
F&n and the PUP, most notably on issues of education, health and social services 
and, to a lesser extent, on housing. 
l The two parties have similar views on how the Assembly should work. They are 
keener on building devolution from below. developing models of republican- 
loyalist co-operation on local councils and wish to devolved the powers of the civic 
forum to the local level. 
l The consociational model of democracy imposed within the GFA should not be 
held responsible for the development of more vigorous ethnic bloc rivalries. It has 
been demonstrated elsewhere that the ‘greening of the SDLP’ occurred after the 
collapse of an experiment in consociatiomilism in 1974 (Evans, J. Tonge, J. and 
Murray, G. ‘Constitutional Nationalism and Socialism in, Northern Ireland: the 
Greening of the SDLP, in Denver, D. et al., British Elections and Parties Review 
10. Ethnic bloc divisions exist independently of Assembly arrangements. The 
Assembly does not preclude their dismantling, nor reinforce such division. For 
their part, Sinn FCin MLAs see pan-nationalism, insofar as it existed, as a construct 
of the peace process, not a consequence within the Assembly. 
l The degree of potential Sinn F&n-PUP co-operation is such that it should assist 
when parallel consent or weighted majority voting rules are deployed within the 
Assembly. There may be sufficient consensus within the Assembly to make the 
deployment of such rules rare, as on many issues (for example, tuition fees and the 
1 l+) divisions within parties are greater than those be.tween parties. This 
conclusion, however, needs a broader based assessment of MLAs to be sustained 
with confidence. 
l Co-operation at Assembly level between republicans and loyalists may have a 
spillover effect, but it is premature to assume this in the short term. The extent of 
hostility to Sinn F&n in respect of voting preferences displayed by PUP members 
is indicative of the need for a substantial thawing process. It also reflects the gulf in 
constitutional agendas and indicates the continued importance of such questions. 
